

CHAPTER 8

1945–1950s: From the Ashes Arising



THE WORLD IN RUINS

It is difficult now to describe, or even to imagine, the extent and gravity of destruction wrought by World War II, for all but the nations isolated by location (such as Canada, the USA, and others in the Western Hemisphere) or a few with some special political understanding (Switzerland and Sweden).

In Europe alone at least *60 million* civilians and soldiers were killed. There were at least 10 million more deaths in North Africa, Southeast and Southern Asia, China, and Japan. In addition, there was the almost unimaginable physical destruction of bridges, railroads, ships, and factories—even whole cities. To all of that must be added the associated *social destruction* of the economic and political realms, and—more difficult to pin down, but ultimately very important—the breakdown of morale.

Considering only Europe, few indeed were those who had not lost at least one member of their family, whether in the trenches, in bombed cities, or in concentration camps. And few families escaped some sort of physical incapacitation (through wounds, fire, disease, malnutrition).

By itself, all of that was more than enough. But there was something else: the issue of political or economic leadership. In each country before or during the war, it had been either at best inadequate and at worst disgraceful. *Everywhere.*

After the war, the fruit of that ongoing incompetence and treachery was a heavy weight to be borne by all Europeans, Africans, and Asians, with significant political consequences for the establishment. The political fallout in the USA, however, was much less. Here there was only a small minority conscious of the U.S. record, which itself had been stained badly by frequently helpful U.S. policies toward fascist Germany, Japan, and Italy. (Not to mention the egregious lack of U.S. support, disguised as “neutrality” for Republican [anti-Franco] Spain.)

In the USA, public opinion was dominated by something like an opposite set

of attitudes of Europe. Here it was all triumph, pride, and satisfaction, diluted only by widespread worries that after the war the depression of the 1930s would start all over again. Popular opinion in the United States has only rarely been concerned with matters of leadership and treachery. After the war it was marked by some combination of rejoicing and relief—and “Let’s party!”

U.S. AID AND U.S. POLICIES

Immediately after the war ended, almost all of Europe, and much of Asia experienced almost total political and economic collapse. If anything was to be done to breathe life back into the desperate nations’ economies, the USA alone had the economic and political resources to take the first steps.

As the United States took the lead in relief and reconstruction, some of its policies were motivated by simple decency; others were not. In any case, the USA *had to act*.

The immediate alternative to the USA putting its foot down was a global drift into deep chaos and *a decisive shift away from capitalism*, given the prevailing left-leaning political attitudes of a substantial percentage—even a majority—of the populations of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy (and many smaller countries, such as Greece and Holland).

Both U.S. political and business leaders saw the postwar world, for better for worse, as providing new opportunities at home and abroad. With few exceptions, U.S. business heads had been fervent opponents of the taxes, expenditures, and social policies of the New Deal. By the time the postwar period opened, however, experience had taught many what a powerful few had always known; namely, that the State can be a *friend* as well as a foe. Most especially had that lesson been learned by those in the industries that converted from autos to tanks and airplanes, from typewriters to machine guns—war production.

The understanding of those in the key industries was that The Depression had finally been ended by massive military expenditures. That realization made it easy for them (and, soon after, for workers) to support U.S. policies for an economically revived Europe and global economy. Presently, there was a majority support for the policies of what came to be called *rescue, rebuilding, and modernization*. And it did not take long for those policies to be tightly connected to the evolving Cold War (as will be discussed in Chapter 9).

This is not meant to suggest that there was a conspiracy involved. Not at all. None was needed. Instead, it is sufficient to see the emergence and shaping of our domestic and foreign policies—including the instigation and maintenance

of the Cold War — as a simply a *meeting of the minds*. There was a convergence of different, but overlapping, mutually supportive interests: those of business, of global-minded economic and political figures, of militarists, and of idealists.

Item A similar confluence exists today with those who support the Bush administration. Coming together is a seemingly bizarre set of interest groups, one that includes Wall Street, businesses small and large, Evangelical Christians, militarists, racists, anti-abortionists, gun lovers, and among other groups, some war veterans. Doubtless some in those groups support all of the others. (A certain clustering of beliefs and attitudes is common and typical. Views of an individual or group on a multitude of issues can often be predicted from limited data.) Other Bush administration supporters, however, should at least feel uncomfortable commingling with their fellows; for example, anti-abortionists *might* have with concerns about gun lovers. (Or considering some of their murderous attacks on health clinics, they might not.)

Through the convergence of interests and interest groups, it became possible for U.S. domestic and foreign policies after 1945 to be framed in terms combining expanding markets, idealism, and the declared need to confront a militarily threatening Soviet Union. In the hubbub of discussions, few, if any, noted that the USSR had been weakened more seriously than any other economy (except perhaps Japan — which we had immediately occupied); few, if any, pointed out that the stated need for confrontation was a total fabrication.

Rescue Operations

We turn first to rescue operations. They were frantic and irregular, and only barely associated with subsequent rebuilding and modernization. Both rebuilding and modernization came to be an important part of the Marshall Plan (1948) and NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Taken together, they were designed to be a large step toward a reborn global economy and the Cold War.

As used here, *rescue* refers to attempts to meet the basic needs for survival (food, medicine, fuel) for the many nations unable to provide for their people, millions of whom had been shunted around ruthlessly for years.

The need was deep in Britain and the Soviet Union and, of course, in the defeated nations. Also in need were smaller countries, the occupied countries (Denmark, Norway, Poland, Holland, and Belgium), and in those allied with the Germans and Italians in Central and Eastern Europe.

By itself and through the new (1945) United Nations, the USA supplied vast quantities of food and clothing and medical supplies and facilitated the

relocation of the displaced persons, from mid-1945 through 1946—stimulating the U.S. economy in the process.

During this period malnutrition and poor health were common. Tens of millions of people were close to starvation and nearly freezing to death. Whatever the self-interest in rescue activities, they were usually done with decency and dispatch. Looking back, it is fair to say that of all the many U.S. actions abroad after World War II, our rescue policies are the *only ones readily discernible as humanitarian*, instead of ways for increasing profits and power.

Rebuilding

Unlike the rescue activities, because of the various demands of national and business self-interest, rebuilding could not be accomplished either swiftly or with much decency. Throughout, the self-interest of the strong very much outweighed the needs of the weak.

Serious debate and discussions between Britain and the USA began as early as 1942. Both within and between the two countries, disagreements were vigorous. They arose from different views as to what was best for their *own* country's future.

In 1944, the first agreements were signed, beginning with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF, or the Fund) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Redevelopment (the IBRD, or the World Bank). In 1946, in order to meet the desperate needs of the British and French (after strenuous negotiations), giant *loans* (in the billions of dollars) were extended. The following year, in Havana, an international conference put together the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It became the blueprint for many later trade agreements including, most recently, the World Trade Organization (the WTO).

The stated aims of those institutions were global stability, expansion, and development. And then as now, the agreements evoked the protests of the weaker nations. (These days there are also protests of workers and environmentalists.)

In the late 1940s, there followed a string of European treaties: the Marshall Plan (1948) and its military counterpart, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), then the French and German Coal and Steel Community. These were the first steps toward today's European Union.

All the foregoing took their shape and directions essentially dictated by the USA. U.S. power was immense and virtually beyond dispute (and until very recently, all others were too weak to complain or resist).

Global institutions such as the IMF, which began with a particular task, have

adapted to intermittent crises by enlarging their scope and going beyond their original mandate—often with harmful results. (See Block; Stiglitz.) This is another way of saying that is, given the periodic crises of capitalism, the scope required to accomplish a task in one period becomes much enlarged in a later period. That is, as the capitalist process lurches into and out of crises, at every turn *more* has to be dealt with if it is to emerge from the *next* crisis.

Put still another way, the enlarging scope of policy required to emerge from any given crisis—let’s call it *Crisis 1*—also assures that the next crisis that occurs, *Crisis 2*, if it is to be resolved, will extend its difficulties *even more deeply* into the larger social process. Always.

Modernization

The institutional rebuilding of the global economy after World War II by the IMF and the IBRD was already substantial as the 1950s ended. Even more important was that the political economy of U.S. capitalism had by then also found the means to keep its own and other key nations’ economies on a path of economic *expansion*—at least until the 1970s.

Sitting at the hot center of those means was the political economy of the Cold War. By design or not, it served as the essential means for widespread postwar modernization.

After the United States, the two most powerful and modern economies from the 1950s on were those of Japan and Germany. Completely smashed by the war, both became the principal strategic bastions—in effect, *outposts* or *forts*—of the United States in its postwar conflicts with China and the Soviet Union,

Both Germany and Japan’s economies were effectively subsidized into modernization and expansion by the Cold War. That was just as true for the USA—and in lesser degree for several other nations.

JAPAN: U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND NAVAL BASE

After the war Japan became an immense aircraft carrier and distant naval base for the United States—most obviously, but not only, in Japan’s colony of Okinawa. Okinawa was (and still is) occupied by the USA. From 1949 on and increasingly as we approach the present, its people have mounted major protests against the USA. Most often these have been against the U.S. military’s frequent rapes, but some are also objecting to the U.S. military using their island for practice bombing, often with disastrous results for the people there.

Japan itself has served a variety of military roles of importance to the United

States. It served as a key manufacturer of napalm during the Vietnam War. It continues to function as a (covert) storage point for U.S. nuclear weapons. All of that and more, despite that Japan has vigorously and officially seen itself (since the war) as a pacifist nation. (See Johnson.)

When World War II ended, U.S.-occupied Japan was demoralized, destitute, and capital-hungry. The inward flow of U.S. dollars began almost immediately; and after 1950, with the Korean war, the flow rose to great heights. One unintended consequence was that Japan modernized to such an extent that by the 1960s it was *the main competitor* of the United States (most importantly in electronics and autos).

By the close of the 1970s, Japan was well on its way to becoming what it is now: the second strongest economy and the main creditor of both the USA and the global economy.

GERMANY: THE U.S. FORTRESS IN EUROPE

Germany played a role in Europe much like that of Japan in Asia—as the U.S. fortress. Germany became and remains Europe’s largest economy. That rise was much aided by the costs to the USA of its many military bases. Since 1960 there have been at least 350,000 U.S. troops *permanently stationed* in West Germany, resulting in flows of dollars to Germany for the upkeep of all those troops (housing, food, entertainment).

This military money was in addition to the effective subsidization of German transport, communications, and other parts of the infrastructure. Taken together, these direct and indirect subsidies served as critically important stimuli for the German economy.

From the viewpoint of Britain, the Soviet Union, and France (who were falling into debt to or treated with hostility by the United States) those U.S. gifts to Germany were viewed darkly. But for the global economy and for the economy of the USA, *they worked*:

[F]rom the time that European recovery was well in progress, the world entered a spell of unusually rapid economic growth that was sustained without significant interruption for a quarter of a century. The increase in world production of agricultural goods was 32 percent between 1948 and 1958 and 20 percent between 1958 and 1968; of minerals, 40 percent....and 58 percent...of manufactures 60 percent...and 100 percent in the later decade. The volume of exports of the non-communist countries grew even faster: 83 percent...and 113 percent [to 1968].

The true ‘American century’ arrived between 1947 and 1972, the golden years

of the postwar expansion. During this run, real GNP grew at a rate of 3.7 percent per year, real disposable income per person at 2.3 percent per year, civilian unemployment [was at] the lowest quarter-century average in the statistical series dating back to 1890, and...corporate profitability...rose substantially over most of the period, peaking in the mid-1960s.

In those times the United States was the only superpower...[and its] economic policies could be formulated in splendid isolation....Corporations could raise wages and benefits annually, keep the industrial peace, pay the bill out of productivity increases, and pass off any added costs in higher product prices with little fear of losing customers to new oligopolistic rivals or foreign suppliers.... Neither foreign competition nor balance of international payments constraints intruded...in any serious way. The United States exported more than it imported, with unbroken surpluses through 1970 and net exports of goods and services well into the 1970s...(Du Boff)

But all of that was happening within a larger developmental process that had begun to appear in the 1920s and was shoved aside in the 1930s by The Depression. Coming was this new stage of capitalist development: monopoly capitalism and the Cold War.

But first, let us examine two other significant U.S. involvements in the 1950s—the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The war in Korea was long and disastrous to the Korean people, and because it has yet to be resolved, it deserves serious attention still today. For the USA during this time, the Vietnam War was just beginning.

APPENDIX

The Wars in Korea and Vietnam



KOREA: WAR WITHOUT END

On any list of the many peoples who have been ravaged by invaders over the centuries, Korea stands tragically near the top. Since their culture began, the Koreans have had the misfortune both to be bounded by *Imperial* China on the mainland and also to be only a skipping stone's throw across the sea from *Imperial* Japan. Those nearby societies saw the Korean people and their resources through imperialist eyes: merely as exploitable objects. If that were not enough, along came the USA and the Soviet Union.

In the Korean war—still not officially ended in 2006 C.E.—more than 3 million Koreans have died, as have at least 1 million Chinese, and about 60,000 U.S. combatants. It was the consequence of an insane power struggle between the USSR and the USA—joined later by China.

What follows is thought by some, *revising history after the fact*, as controversial. It isn't. Those who wish to find a solid basis for my position can find it in two scholarly volumes of Cumings (and its popular one volume version, Cumings and Halliday), plus Matray's dictionary on the war.

A Country Divided —by the USA

Korea had long been a brutally treated colony of the Japanese. Then in 1945, just as the Pacific war ended, the USA and the USSR—without consulting any Koreans—forced a division of Korea into North Korea and South Korea at the 38th Parallel:

Japanese armies, according to the Soviet-American agreement, were disarmed north of the 38th parallel by Russia and south of the line by the United States. Lengthy conferences failed to unify the nation, for neither the Soviet nor the Americans wanted to chance the possibility that a unified Korea would move into the opposing camp. (La Feber)

Later we'll see that the USA forced an equally arrogant and insane division upon Vietnam. Why? Because all knew that *our man* (the corrupt and oppressive Diem, in the South) would lose easily to Ho Chi Minh (in the North) if the free election scheduled for 1954 were held. So, as with the 38th parallel in Korea, the 17th parallel in Vietnam became an artificial dividing line, cutting across natural areas of geographic, cultural, and climatic continuity.

The inevitable result of the 1945 division in Korea was considerable confusion and conflict among all Koreans. By the late 1940s, military incursions—each “country” was armed—were taking place from *both* sides, and Korea was moving toward civil war.

The USA justified its intervention by the ostensible need to respond to an invasion from the north; and the USSR did the same regarding an invasion from the south. The conflicts of preceding months had provided such justifications for *both* sides. (For more on that point, plus the entire history, see again Matray; Cumings and Halliday.) The well-being and safety of the *people* of Korea, however, were of no concern to either the USSR or the USA.

In a recent book, Chalmers Johnson, a leading U.S. authority on Asia, undertook a reexamination of our policies in Korea. His remarks on the background of the Korean war deserve a long quotation:

The end of World War II had proved no more a ‘liberation day’ in Korea than for Czechoslovakia or other nations of Eastern Europe. The Japanese had occupied, colonized, and exploited Korea since 1905, just as the Nazis, following the 1938 Munich Agreement, had divided, occupied, and ravished Czechoslovakia. Both countries now underwent transformations into colonies of the victors of World War II. At about the same time in 1948 when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [at the behest of Stalin] was carrying out a coup d’etat in Prague, right-wing forces in the southern half of divided Korea, then under the control of the United States, were slaughtering at least thirty thousand dissident peasants on the island of Cheju (in the North), part of a process by which [Syngman Rhee’s] U.S. puppet regime in South Korea, a government every bit as unpopular as Gotwald’s Stalinist government in Czechoslovakia, consolidated power...Gotwald [and Rhee] were prototypes of the faceless bureaucrats the Soviets and the Americans would both use for the next forty years to govern their ‘captive nations’ (a term the Eisenhower administration applied to the Soviet Union’s satellites). (C. Johnson)

A *de facto* civil war had begun by 1948–49. Had that civil war been fought out by the Koreans *without* foreign intervention, doubtless there would have been

much bloodshed and damage. But there would have been nothing approaching either the physical and human damage of the Korean war or the distortion of the lives of both North and South during the war and ever since—for neither side had an air force.

Left to themselves and (in comparison with what in fact occurred) given the fact that the available weaponry for both sides was minimal, it is inconceivable that their civil war would have killed the several million Koreans it did, or that the cities of North Korea could have been as ruthlessly bombed and totally destroyed (as they were by U.S. planes). There was no aerial bombing of the South.

Now add to that

1. Continued occupation by the USA—for the 50 years
2. The U.S.-imposed fascist dictatorship of S. Rhee from 1948 to 1980 (noted above)
3. The fortified border—from 1951 until today, insanely populated with a portion of the 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea

The USA has certainly done its best to keep Korea under its thumb.

Ah! But without U.S. action wouldn't either China or the USSR have intervened militarily? If the USA had stayed out, it is unlikely that the USSR could have joined the war, given its still desperate situation at home in 1950 and its far distant location.

The Chinese *did* intervene, but only well after the war had begun—and after the U.S. Commanding General (MacArthur) had issued statements about the desirability not only of bombing China, but of doing so *with the atom bomb*. After which, it should be noted, the general went back to the States to parades, a rousing cheer in Congress, then sought to run for president (as a Republican). He didn't get the nomination and ended up as head of a corporation. (Sherwin, Cumings, Wittner)

It's a fair guess that *all* Koreans would have been much better off if they had just been left alone to fight it out among themselves. But nobody asked them.

The Korean war began as McCarthyism was taking hold. So it was that there were *very few dissenting voices* about that war in the USA, whether in the newspapers, radio, TV, or even on college campuses.

Story: Korean History in a Plain Brown Wrapper

Story In 1953 I left Berkeley to take a teaching position at a university in New York. Soon after I arrived, I was asked to represent the Economics Department on a faculty committee organizing a new interdisciplinary major: American

Studies. I said OK. The prof from American history and I became friends fairly soon, even though he was politically conservative and I wasn't. One day, after our committee meeting, he said, "Doug, here's a book I think you might find interesting." I was surprised to see that it was wrapped in plain brown paper. I thought, wow, what kind of book is this distinguished prof handing me? Is it dirty stories, dirty pix — both?

When I got to my study, I took off the brown paper with, I must confess, some eagerness. I was now holding a copy of a book I had already read — not dirty at all, but *dangerous* (or so the other prof must have thought). The book was *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, by I. F. Stone, a mildly left-leaning journalist. It had been published in 1952 by Monthly Review Press. No other publishing house would touch it. With the help of a rich supporter, *Monthly Review Magazine* became a book publisher just so that book could be read. I add that the so-called "hidden history" was in fact much the same material covered above and in the books by Cumings and Matray.


Troops and Nukes

By the 1980s, after much struggling by its ordinary citizens — and with no discernable help from the USA — South Korea had gotten rid of its U.S.-installed dictator and began to emerge from the fascism he (and we) had brought into being. For the South that path still has a long way to go, not helped by the presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops and the unacknowledged U.S. domination over Korean foreign policy, among other matters.

Meanwhile, North Korea, devastated in every human and social dimension by the war's pitiless bombing and shelling from air and sea, emerged with what may be the tightest dictatorship in the world. *And it has nukes.*

Recently, many trembled as North Korea shook a nuclear fist at the USA. Perhaps it did so as a bargaining chip for improving the conditions of its starving people; perhaps not. The probability is, though, that it was to remind the USA that there could be *consequences* of a U.S.-led invasion of North Korea. Perhaps mindful of these consequences, the USA chose not to invade. At present. (It would be reassuring to be able to believe that the USA will handle future nuclear crises around the globe with the good sense it lacked 50 years ago. Reassuring, yes, but don't count on it.)

To those who cheer our "victory" in the Cold War, our fist-shaking against the "axis of evil," and our "mission accomplished" in Iraq, here is a request.



That request becomes more emphatic if one examines the many other cruel postwar U.S.-instigated histories of the ex-colonial world; in Latin America (Cuba, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile)—with Argentina and Bolivia currently in our gun sights—in the Middle East, in Africa.

Now we relate the early history of U.S. involvement in what became the war in Vietnam. As will be seen below, before the Pacific War ended (that is, in 1944), the USA became involved in ways which, had they continued, would have *prevented* the war. But soon after the Pacific War ended, we became involved again in ways that made the war in Vietnam *unavoidable*. It is a sorry story.

VIETNAM: THE USA TAKES OVER FROM FRANCE

The Betrayal of Vietnam

In December 1945, two U.S. merchant ships steamed into Haiphong Harbor. (I had seen them loading in Manila Harbor a few days before.) Greeting the ships were giant signs painted on the walls of the streets of the Haiphong harbor. They said (in English):

WELCOME ABE LINCOLN!

Dutch and British soldiers—just freed from Japanese prison camps and

hastily armed and clothed by the USA—walked off those ships into the winter air of North Vietnam. Little did the Vietnamese know that the troops had been transported there in response to a dirty deal with the French, whose colony Vietnam was.

The troops were there to hold the fort, so to speak, until French soldiers could arrive in thirteen *more* U.S. merchant ships, loaded at Le Havre. This was the beginning of betrayal. In 1944 President Roosevelt and Ho Chi Minh had reached an agreement that Vietnam would become independent. It would finally be its own country, free of its century-long occupation and exploitation by the French. That, at least, was the agreement. But within months of the troop landing at Haiphong, at least 10,000 Vietnamese had been killed by French aerial bombing—assisted by the USA. (See Young.)

The French Connection

U.S. involvement in Vietnam came about because France, led by General de Gaulle, was reluctant to join the U.S. plans for uniting Europe. The French, and de Gaulle in particular, saw U.S.-proposed European unity as a first step toward U.S. dominance of Europe. The U.S. cooperation with France in Vietnam in 1945 was, quite simply, a bribe to the French to go along with U.S. plans for Europe. (Young)

And in Vietnam the worst was yet to come. From 1945 on, the French waged aerial and land war against the Vietnamese in the North. It was noted earlier that France—as with all European countries—was flattened by World War II. So how could she fight another war? Because *the USA laid out the cash for France's war*—that's how. (See Kahin; Young.)

A Surprise Vietnamese Victory

Then in 1954, much to their surprise and bewilderment, the French were badly defeated in the long battle of Dien Bien Phu. Now the French were done for and out, but there was a sharp political difference between the South (still loyal to the French, and friendly to the USA) and the Communist North. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, the North had led the resistance and fighting against the French. (And, as I knew from my air-sea rescue activities during the Pacific War, *the North had been an ally of the USA against Japan*. Down the memory hole...)

To resolve the North-South differences, it was agreed that there would be a *free election*. As will be seen later, it was clear to all—especially to Diem, the

corrupt southern leader—that in a free election, Ho Chi Minh would win in a landslide.

So at an international meeting in Geneva in 1954, the still all-powerful USA was able to push through the notion that Vietnam, instead of having a free election, should be divided in two—as with Korea, and with the same horrible results.

The U.S. bribe to France regarding Vietnam was an extremely costly one for the dead and wounded U.S. GIs. The bribe was orders of magnitude more costly the Asian residents involved—that is, for the *several million people* killed, wounded, and displaced in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, none of whom were ever consulted in the matter.

References for Part II

- Allen, G. C., *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867–1937*
- Arnold, T., *The Folklore of Capitalism*
- Ashworth, W. *A Short History of the World Economy Since 1750*
- Baran, P. and Sweezy, P., *Monopoly Capital; An Essay on the American and Social Order*
- Block, F. *The Origins of Economic Disorder*
- Bowden, W., Karpovitch, M, and Usher, A., *An Economic History of Europe Since 1750*
- Brady, R. A., *The Rationalization Movement in German Industry* (1933)
- _____, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (1937)
- _____, *Business as a System of Power* (1943)
- Chomsky, A. N., *Year 501: The Conquest Continues*
- Cumings, B. *The Origins of the Korean War*
- _____, Halliday, J. *Korea: The Unknown War*
- Dobb, M., *The Soviet Union Economic Development Since 1917*
- Du Boff, R. *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*
- Feis, H., *Europe, The World's Banker: 1870–1914*
- Fussell, P., *The Great War and Modern Memory*
- Gerschenkron, A., *Bread and Democracy in Germany*
- Gross, B., *Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America*
- Hobsbawm, E., *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870*
- Hochschild, A., *King Leopold's Ghost*
- Hoffmann, R., *Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry*
- Hunt, E. K., *The History of Economic Thought: A Critical Perspective*
- Johnson, C., *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*
- Jonas, S. *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power*
- Kahin, G., *The United States in Vietnam*
- Keynes, J. M., *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*
- _____, *Essays in Persuasion*

- La Feber, W. *America, Russia, and the Cold War*
- Langer, W., *An Encyclopedia of World History*
- Laski, H., *The Rise of European Liberalism*
- Lewis, S., *It Can't Happen Here*
- Magdoff, H., *The Age of Imperialism*
- Malraux, A., *Man's Hope*
- Matray, J. I. *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War*
- Melman, W. *Pentagon Capitalism*
- Navasky, V., *Naming Names*
- Oglesby, C., *Containment and Change*
- Orwell, G., *Homage to Catalonia*
- Phillips, K., *Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich*
- Reed, John., *The Ten Days That Shook the World*
- Salvemini, G., *Under the Axe of Fascism*
- Schmidt, C., *The Corporate State in Action*
- Sherwin, M. J. *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Origins of the Arms Race*
- Silone, I., *Fontamara*
- Stiglitz, G. *Globalization and Its Discontents*
- Stone, I. F., *The Hidden History of the Korean War*
- Taylor, A. *The Course of German History...Since 1815*
- Veblen, T. *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*
- Williams, W. A. *Empire As A Way Of Life*
- Wittner, L. *Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate*
- Young, M. *The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990*
- Zinn, H. *A People's History of the United States*